Rethinking Import and Export Controls for Defense-Related Goods by Gansler, Jacques S. & Lucyshyn, William
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Acquisition Research Program Acquisition Research Symposium
2013-07-01
Rethinking Import and Export Controls for
Defense-Related Goods
Gansler, Jacques S.; Lucyshyn, William
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/54603
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
  S c h o o l  o f  P u b l i c  P o l i c y
Revised May 2013 
 
This  research was par t ia l ly sponsored by a g rant  f rom
The Naval  Postg raduate School
Rethinking imPoRt and exPoRt contRolS 
foR defenSe-Related goodS 
 
By: 































The Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise at the University of Maryland’s 
School of Public Policy provides the strategic linkage between the public and private 
sector to develop and improve solutions to increasingly complex problems associated 
with the delivery of public services—a responsibility increasingly shared by both 
sectors.  Operating at the nexus of public and private interests, the Center 
researches, develops, and promotes best practices; develops policy 
recommendations; and strives to influence senior decision-makers toward improved 
government and industry results. 
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There is little doubt that America’s capacity to successfully wage war relies on promoting the 
health of the defense industry. At the same time, however, the U.S. must have selective controls 
on foreign access to critical defense technologies. Accordingly, import and export controls for 
defense-related goods and information have long been the focus of debate among American 
policymakers and business advocates.  
Because the United States is a dominant and growing source of many countries’ defense 
technology, the ideological battle over import and export controls has grown fiercer. At the 
center of this debate is the question of whether emphasis should be placed on national security 
concerns—controlling access to American military technology—or economic concerns—
permitting American manufacturers and companies to more easily export these technologies for 
profit, while protecting them from foreign competition. Defense industry advocates, for their 
part, argue that current law stifles business, citing, for example, the intense and long licensing 
processes that are required to export seemingly insignificant items (e.g., nuts and bolts that are 
considered “dual-use” because at one point they were developed for use in military weapons 
systems; Avery, 2012). At the same time, some national security experts argue for greater 
sharing with our allies in order to ensure interoperability and maximum overall military 
capability, when fighting together in a coalition.  
These issues are, at their core, a manifestation of a changing global environment—an adaptation 
from a bipolar world (i.e., the United States versus the Soviet Union) to a truly globalized world 
in which the affairs of all countries are interconnected. Indeed, the so-called modern arms control 
regime consists of the legislative remnants of a bygone era, strung together haphazardly and in 
desperate need of reform.  
Substantive export control restrictions first emerged during World War I as a natural extension of 
the “total war” that ensued. The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 gave the President the 
power to oversee or restrict any and all trade between the U.S. and its enemies in times of war. 
The trend towards increased export restrictions continued as the Neutrality Act of 1935—
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possibly the strictest export restriction regime ever devised—was enacted in the years leading up 
to World War II, cutting off any sale of military weaponry to belligerents.  
The end of the Second World War ushered in a new regime. Previously, restrictions were 
imposed on the basis of country (Trading with the Enemy Act) or product (Neutrality Act). 
However, in the post-war environment, a more mixed approach was deemed necessary. The 
Export Control Act of 1949 was the beginning of this new era of export controls, focused 
primarily on restricting trade with Soviet-bloc countries. 
Today’s most important export regulatory authorities, the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), both derive from the 
1970s. The legislation leading to the creation of these regulation regimes is described below. 
• Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976—grants the President the power to control the 
export of defense products and services. The act mandated the creation of the ITAR. The 
principal objective of the act was to ensure that exports of defense systems and services 
are used solely for legitimate defensive purposes. A secondary objective is to restrict the 
export of certain sensitive materials, such that they are only available to trusted countries, 
after a strict licensing process and thorough documentation, as well as other 
requirements, such as not transferring the technologies to any other country. 
 
• International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977—authorizes the 
President to take actions to regulate commerce in the case of a declared national 
emergency. Potential actions include blocking transactions or freezing assets and, if 
attacked, actually seizing the assets of the aggressor. In effect, the IEEPA gives the 
President the authority to cut off trade with certain states, non-state actors, and groups of 
individuals. 
 
• Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979—is reauthorized annually by the President 
under IEEPA. The act was a derivation of the 1969 act by the same name and focuses 
primarily on dual-use items (i.e., items that have both commercial and military purposes, 
or result in a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction). Unlike the earlier version, the 
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1979 act included the provision that if an item was so prevalent abroad, and of a quality 
comparable to what would be exported from the United States, such that trying to control 
it would be a futile exercise, it should not be controlled. The Secretary of Commerce is 
tasked with making this decision. This was a concession to business interests that felt the 
law, at times, unfairly restricted trade, even though its restriction would have no 
noticeable effect on the goal of restricting access to these items.  
 
Unlike IEEPA, both AECA and EAA rely on regulatory mechanisms for enforcement, namely 
the ITAR, administered by the Department of State, and the EAR, administered by the Bureau of 
Industry and Science within the Department of Commerce. These organizations develop the lists 
of controlled exports in each category, determine which applicants receive licenses, and punish 
those who violate the law. The ITAR and EAR are described below. 
• International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR)—the set of regulations built around the 
AECA dealing primarily with national security and expressly, defense-related items and 
services. The products regulated include weapons systems (e.g., aircraft, tanks, etc.) but 
also include subsystems or components critical to military systems. The determining 
factors are listed as follows: 
a. Is it specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted, or modified for a military 
application, and 
• does not have predominant civil applications, and 
• does not have performance equivalent (defined by form, fit, and function) to those 
of an article or service used for civil applications; or 
b. Is it specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted, or modified for a military 
application, and has significant military or intelligence applicability such that control 
under this subchapter is necessary? (ITAR, part 120) 
In order to remain in compliance when exporting products that potentially fall under 
ITAR regulations, the exporter is required to navigate a demanding licensing process that 
can take a significant amount of time and resources. These licenses are issued for the 
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item, not for the order; thus, “on a single purchase order some products may require a 
license while others do not” (Cheadle, 2005, p. 80).  
Moreover, ITAR Part 121, known as the U.S. Munitions List (USML), is not a list of 
products so much as a list of categories, descriptions, and rules to determine whether or 
not a product should be controlled. For example, one such category is major weapons 
systems. Note, however, that the category includes “all components used in the items 
covered by this category if they were specifically developed or modified for military 
applications” (ITAR, Part 121). Often, the State Department has to conduct a lengthy 
review in order to determine whether the component in question was initially created for 
a specific military use. The State Department also attempts to determine whether the end 
product is for “military use,” that is, will “be used in a military way for offensive or 
defensive purposes” (Cheadle, 2005, p. 82). 
• Export Administration Regulations (EAR)—regulations governed by the Department of 
Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) under the Commerce Control List 
(CCL).The EAR, unlike ITAR, is focused on dual-use products, classified under the 
Commerce Control List (CCL), as well as anti-boycott provisions of the EAA. The BIS 
uses a simpler set of rules than does the State Department to determine licensing 
requirements for commercial items.  
 
In order to grant a license, the Commerce Department carries out an inter-departmental 
process wherein the Department carries out the evaluation, but with the input and support 
of other agencies, in particular, the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy. If no 
outside agency input is needed, the Department of Commerce can either inform the 
applicant that a license is not required, or approve or deny the request. Should the 
Commerce Department determine that another agency’s review is necessary, there is a 
timeline for the agency to return its recommendation. Within 10 days, the agency may 
request further information or details; within 30 days, the agency needs to either 
recommend approval or denial of the license. If it chooses to give no feedback, the 
agency is seen as having no objection to whatever decision the BIS/Commerce 
Department chooses (Fergusson, 2005). 
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The United States does not use restrictions on imports in the same way as on exports—rather 
than rely on lists, the restrictions are based on the expressed preference for American goods over 
imported goods, particularly in a few classes. Also, unlike export restriction laws, which have 
evolved significantly over time to the point where their original content is practically 
undetectable, import procurement laws have undergone less tumultuous changes; in fact, the 
original laws are still largely in effect. These laws are also not as extensive as export control 
laws, but pertain to a far greater number of items. Below, we describe the two primary import 
restriction laws, the Buy American Act and the Berry Amendment.  
The Buy American Act, passed in 1933, was rooted in the belief that by increasing the 
government purchase of domestic goods, the United States could lift itself out of the Great 
Depression. As its name implies, the act gave preferential treatment to the use of American-made 
products. Today, the act contains three original sections and two additional ones. 
Reviews of the Buy American Act are mixed. Although some see it as a necessary step toward 
protecting American business, others do not think it has worked as intended. For example, 
Hirschman (1998) says, “The Buy American Act appears to have been poorly planned, hastily 
passed, and inconsistently enforced” (p. 23). Hirschman largely blames poor definitions, lack of 
standard rules, and general vagueness. Indeed, many companies find it difficult to interpret the 
regulations. To cite one case, in 2011, Home Depot was sued by its competitors for allegedly 
selling Chinese goods (such as power tools) to the United States government, in contradiction of 
the Buy American Act. Home Depot, for its part, rejected the claims, saying if they did sell 
foreign goods it was unintentional, but this still prompted an investigation (Little, 2011). 
Another statute related to the government procurement of foreign goods is the Berry 
Amendment. While the Buy American Act gives preference to domestic products over foreign 
products with certain exceptions, the Berry Amendment overrides these exceptions for particular 
items, namely food, clothing, and specialty metals. However, whereas the Buy American Act 
applies to all government contracting, the Berry Amendment applies only to defense contracting. 
In addition, whereas the act covers only procurement within the United States, the Berry 
Amendment is enforced worldwide. Finally, unlike the Buy American Act, which defines the 
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term “substantially all” as no more than 50% of a product, the Amendment requires that 100% of 
the product be American made (Grasso, 2005). 
In force since 1941, the Berry Amendment was actually an amendment to the Fifth Supplemental 
Defense Department Appropriations Act and has been altered multiple times since. This 
regulation maintains that the DoD “give preference in procurement to domestically produced, 
manufactured, or homegrown products, notably food, clothing, fabrics, and specialty metals” 
(Grasso, 2005, p. i). However, exceptions were later added when food, specialty metals, and 
measuring tools were used for contingency operations and in instances of compelling urgency 
(Grasso, 2005).  
The Berry Amendment requires that certain items be from domestic sources; however, this 
requirement extends to all of the item’s components as well. Accordingly, clothing, explicitly 
listed as a controlled item, must be produced in the United States, as must all of the cotton or 
other cloth materials, natural or synthetic, that are part of the product. This regulation goes 
beyond clothing; for example, if the DoD is trying to obtain cotton swabs, then the cotton must 
be of American origin. The requirement applies to the items being grown, reprocessed, reused, 
and produced. By contrast, the Buy American Act only applies to the end item purchased by the 
government, so weapon systems may, and do, contain foreign parts—usually selected for their 
superior performance. 
Despite these export and import restrictions, our allies are still able to purchase the weapons 
systems that they need from the United States. In fact, the United States is the largest producer 
and exporter of defense goods in the world, supplying dozens of countries with a range of 
defense and military products. On the import side, the United States is capable of designing and 
manufacturing the vast majority of military systems upon which it relies. However, import 
restrictions impede the United States’ ability to acquire defense-related goods as efficiently and 
cost-effectively as possible. The problem here is two-fold. The DoD is barred from acquiring 
foreign suppliers’ products—products that are not only cheaper, but in some instances, 
technically superior. Secondly, the waiver process complicates matters further, creating needless 
delays for products that may not even be available domestically. Clearly, the current regime is 
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far from perfect. Below, we discuss some of the more pressing challenges associated with current 
export and import regulations. 
1. Restrictions on dual-use technologies 
Much to the chagrin of American business, the ability of American companies to export certain 
goods, including non-defense goods, has been curtailed significantly. Restrictions on dual-use 
items are particularly troubling. Many such items were initially developed by the military but 
now are in widespread use, including powerful microchips and computers, but also mundane 
items, like the metal bolts used to build satellites (Avery, 2012). Many items under ITAR 
controls are not top-secret technology; rather, they are very similar to commercial, non-
controlled items. In fact, they increasingly begin as commercial items and then are adopted by 
the military—because of their superior performance and/or lower cost. 
2. Long delays for approval 
Business deals with foreign firms involving any type of controlled good or information must be 
approved in advance. Often, the approval process can take several months. In fact, without the 
appropriate license, even approaching the foreign firm may be illegal. In some instances, making 
a telephone call to a foreign company requires pre-approval. Needless to say, many international 
business opportunities are hindered as a result (Oliver, 2001), which, in turn, diminishes the 
United States’ technological edge by reducing demand for high-tech products. 
3. Fewer opportunities for joint research 
The current regime greatly hinders the opportunity to engage in joint research. American 
institutions are limited, as are foreign students. Combined, these issues are making it harder for 
the U.S. to have significant technological advancements, thus eroding our previously large 
technological advantage over our adversaries (Chakrabarti, 2009). Since information is 
controlled by both ITAR and EAR, new knowledge emerging from American industry can 
require a license for export. In fact, simply passing the information to a foreign national living in 
the United States is considered a “deemed export.” Under the current regulations, companies and 
universities may be required to obtain an export license before releasing controlled dual-use 
technology, or source code subject to the EAR, to a foreign national who is not a permanent 
resident of the United States (or a member of certain groups of protected individuals, such as 
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asylum holders). Consequently, the transfer of technology within the U.S. to a foreign national 
may be considered an export to his home country. As one might imagine, such a status engenders 
many complications for foreign students who want to study advanced technology and science. 
Indeed, even being in a classroom, when a controlled technical procedure is discussed, may be 
considered a violation. As a result, very promising students are deterred from pursuing a 
technology-focused education in the United States; to the detriment of the American commercial 
and defense industries.    
4. Technology outpaces the regulations 
Revisions of the regulations and the control lists are rare, whereas technology advancements are 
constant and regular. This delay means that the regulations fall even further behind, as 
technology advances, making the system even more inadequate as time passes. Thus, much of 
the new technology is not properly protected, and old technology that has become ubiquitous is 
controlled unnecessarily. 
5. Regulations damage relationships with allies 
The current regime may be hurting U.S. relationships with allies. Oliver (2001) notes that 
“Potential allies do not view restricting technology that would enable their citizens to have a 
higher standard of living, or more security, as the act of an America who wants to have friends” 
(Oliver, 2001, p. 5). Our allies may resent when we require that they obtain licenses—let alone 
when we reject them—because these actions hinder their ability to develop, from both an 
economic and security perspective (Oliver, 2001). 
6. Lack of competition results in higher prices 
Import regulations have been successful in their stated purpose of limiting the use of foreign 
products in government contracting. The primary goal of the import control system—protection 
of American manufacturers and producers of certain goods from foreign competition—has, in a 
sense, been successful in that it has supported American businesses that would otherwise lose 
contracts to imported goods that are often cheaper or better. But the policies have had unintended 
consequences. For instance, the cost of hiring contractors is significantly higher than might 
otherwise be the case, because of the lack of competition from abroad. In addition, foreign 
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technologies are not always inferior to those built in America, so they may offer both lower cost 
and higher performance.  
7. Interruptions in the supply chain 
A 2004 study by the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy 
examined 12 major DoD programs and found that 4.3% of the value of the contracts came from 
foreign subcontractors. Additionally, in contradiction to the aforementioned concerns, the report 
states that this has “not negatively impacted long-term readiness or national security;” instead, 
they cite it as a benefit, as it allows the DoD to access foreign technologies, encourages 
interoperable systems with allies, improves foreign access for U.S. firms, and ensures 
competition that helps American industry innovate (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Industrial Policy, 2004, p. v).  
8. Increasing cybersecurity threats  
Virtually all weapon system components, as well as business systems, use software extensively. 
Moreover, software development is now also a global industry, and some of the software used by 
the DoD and the defense industry has been, at least in part, developed abroad. This can include 
countries that may be motivated to exploit and/or manipulate software. This can potentially result 
in the theft of information and intellectual property, the destruction of information systems, or 
even the destruction of physical systems. 
Recommendations 
There is a clear need for both import and export controls; however, the current system definitely 
has significant flaws that impact its ability to succeed. Correcting these issues requires a strong 
plan of action to revamp and re-imagine the control system. Import and export controls are 
clearly necessary in order to ensure the protection of American military technology as well as the 
health of the defense industry. However, the current regime must be revised to take advantage of 
the globalized economy, while addressing the challenges cited in the previous section. Below, we 





• The lists of regulated items should be combined and simplified. 
Exporters are not always sure whether their product is on the USML or the CCL, or 
regulated through some other mechanism, creating confusion and errors. A master list 
would greatly aid the process. Creating a single list would require significant 
commitment on the part of the U.S. government. All redundancies would have to be 
eliminated. First, however, policymakers would have to determine which items actually 
require protection. The removal of thousands of items will act to free up some of the 
backlog in the system, thereby facilitating the creation of a new list. However, this list 
must be frequently updated to take care of rapidly-changing situations (e.g., regarding 
technology, available foreign goods, etc.). 
• Defense-related items should be assigned to categories based on their level of sensitivity.  
Presently, all items are treated equally. This results in tank brake pads that are identical to 
those used on fire trucks being controlled just as stringently as the tank’s complex 
targeting systems or the entire tank itself. This distracts from protecting goods that could 
actually impact national security. 
• Export decisions should be based, in part, on the status of a country’s relationship with 
the United States. 
Because the overwhelming majority of licenses requested are from U.S. allies, and for 
items that are not particularly risky, this would free up significant resources necessary to 
expedite the approval of other licenses, which will make exporting more efficient overall. 
And, because almost all of the license requests of this type are already being approved, 
this policy would not create significant security vulnerabilities. 
Corresponding to the designations assigned to “defense-related goods,” countries should 
be assigned to categories based on the status of their relationship (e.g., most trusted, 
trusted, less trusted, least trusted) with the United States. To borrow from the security 
clearance scheme, once again, an individual with a secret clearance can only gain access 
to documents marked secret or below. (Perhaps for geopolitical sensitivity reasons, this 
could be coded as category A, B, C, or D—and used as an incentive for countries to 
control their third country exports, for example.) Similarly, a country with a mid-level 
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clearance could import items of certain designations without a license. Under this type of 
system, countries would be able to understand what will be required to import certain 
goods from the U.S. prior to beginning what is today a long and complex process. Under 
this system, American regulators and lawmakers could allow license-free exports of 
certain goods to certain countries without allowing open exporting; and yet, more 
carefully controlling which countries can obtain which defense products. 
• The United States should not unilaterally impose controls on commercial variants of 
defense-related goods for which it is not the sole supplier.  
If the United States believes that certain defense-related products should be barred from 
export, it must seek multilateral participation; otherwise, an embargo that is imposed 
unilaterally will be ineffective, not to mention costly to American companies. For 
example, U.S. restrictions on the export of commercial infrared devices led to decreased 
revenues for American firms, while boosting the profits of European firms (for which the 
export of infrared devices was less restrictive). Needless to say, the world is no safer 
simply because the U.S. stopped selling commercial infrared devices to foreign buyers, 
and U.S. producers simply lost their world market. 
 
• Protectionist import restrictions should be eliminated.  
The United States should rely on free-market exchange, not protectionist import policies, 
to promote and improve America’s competitiveness both at home and abroad. Though 
protectionist policies may benefit certain industry segments, the market distortions that 
are created lead to higher prices and reduced domestic consumption. Moreover, the 
industry segments that are protected have less incentive to innovate and reduce their 
costs. As a consequence, the industries themselves may suffer from their lack of global 
competitiveness, leading to decreased revenues from foreign sales. The longer 
protectionist policies are in place, the less competitive the industries will become. 
Reducing import restrictions would lead to the increased domestic development of 
weapons systems and their associated products, both in terms of quantity and quality, 




Our import–export control systems, originally established to protect American security interests, 
have begun to undermine the economic, technologic, and military capabilities of the United 
States. Since the last major revisions of America’s import and export systems, the world has 
changed markedly. Whereas before the United States was the unrivaled leader in most 
technological fields, today it is one of several leaders in many technological fields and is lagging 
in some.  
The United States can no longer afford to pursue an import–export regime that reduces American 
access to new technologies while protecting uncompetitive domestic firms and restricting leading 
U.S. companies from pursuing foreign sales abroad. To be sure, certain technologies must be 
protected. But the best way to ensure that this occurs is by reducing the scale and scope of the 
current restrictions so that attention can be focused on specific technologies, the protection of 
which is vital to U.S. security interests. The failure to reorient our priorities in the new global 
environment will only lead to a technological decline and obsolescence in certain industry 
segments. Technological decline, and the economic decline that it portends, are the true threats to 
America’s security. 
The Administration has recently taken steps to update how the U.S. government protects 
sensitive technologies and regulates exports of munitions and commercial items with military 
applications. These rules will affect items regulated for export under two categories on the 
USML (Aircraft and Associated Equipment and Gas Turbine Engines). Both of these categories 
are extremely important to the aerospace industry and represent more than $20 billion in annual 
exports. There are plans to continue the reviews and reform the remaining 17 USML categories. 




Rethinking Import and Export Controls 
For Defense-Related Goods 
I. Introduction 
There is little doubt that America’s capacity to successfully wage war relies on promoting the 
health of the defense industry. At the same time, however, the U.S. must control foreign access 
to new defense technologies. Accordingly, import and export controls for defense-related goods 
and information have long been the focus of debate among American policymakers and business 
advocates. Indeed, weapon systems constitute a major American industry that is also of great 
importance to geopolitical goals. Small arms, light weapons, and ammunition—a large, though 
relatively cheap segment of weaponry—account for about $996 million in U.S. imports and $607 
million in exports according to UN data (Google Ideas INFO, 2012). Examining the broader data 
on defense-related exports, it becomes clear just how large the U.S. weapons industry is. Defense 
exports of equipment, such as military aircraft, firearms, and explosives, were valued at $22 
billion in 2009 (Government Accountability Office, 2010).  
Because the United States is a dominant and growing source of many countries’ defense 
technology, the ideological battle over import and export controls has grown fiercer. At the 
center of this debate is the question of whether emphasis should be placed on national security 
concerns—controlling access to American military technology—or economic concerns—
permitting American manufacturers and companies to more easily export these technologies for 
profit, while protecting them from foreign competition. Defense industry advocates, for their 
part, argue that current law stifles business, citing, for example, the intense and long licensing 
processes that are required to export seemingly insignificant items (e.g., nuts and bolts that are 
considered “dual-use” because at one point they were developed for use in military weapon 
systems; Avery, 2012). At the same time, some national security experts argue for greater 
sharing with our allies in order to ensure interoperability and maximum overall military 
capability when fighting together in a coalition. But there is also some crossover between the two 
sides; indeed, many proponents of loosening export restrictions claim that doing so actually 
enhances national security. A number of other issues are at stake—such as relationships with our 
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allies and the ability of our allies to obtain American military technology—that all play a role in 
the debate. 
These issues are, at their core, a manifestation of a changing global environment—an adaptation 
from a bipolar world (i.e., the United States versus the Soviet Union) to a truly globalized world 
in which the affairs of all countries are interconnected. Indeed, the so-called modern arms control 
regime consists of the legislative remnants of a bygone era, strung together haphazardly and in 
desperate need of reform. Today, information and technology spread much more quickly, 
making it more difficult to control the re-export and unintended transfer of goods to third parties. 
Globalization also means that the United States continues to import and export in higher 
volumes. As a result, the need for reform grows in significance with each passing day. 
Report Roadmap 
We begin by providing a background on import and export controls, including a historical 
examination of early export restrictions as well as current export and import controls. Then, we 
examine the impact of current policies, including their benefits and drawbacks. Next, we 
describe a policy that, we believe, achieves a balance that enhances both national security and 
economic growth. Finally, we discuss potential obstacles to implementing the policy. 
Throughout the report, we provide examples, often set apart from the main text, in order to 











Substantive export control restrictions first emerged during World War I as a natural extension of 
the “total war” that ensued. The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 gave the President the 
power to oversee or restrict any and all trade between the U.S. and its enemies in times of war. 
The purpose of this act was threefold: “(1) to prevent aid and comfort to enemies; (2) to make 
available for the financing and successful prosecution of the war such funds and property in this 
country as belongs to the enemies or the allies of enemies; and (3) to protect interests in property 
rights of private persons.” (Lourie, 1943, p. 206). To this day, determining who is an “enemy” is 
the responsibility of the executive branch—the President can deem any foreign country an 
enemy, making it illegal for any American (individual or business) to conduct trade with it. The 
only country currently held under this status is Cuba, following the 2008 change of status of 
North Korea. In order to ensure adherence to this law, its provisions carry strong penalties, 
including stiff fines and significant prison terms. 
The trend toward increased export restrictions continued as the Neutrality Act of 1935, possibly 
the strictest export restriction regime ever devised. It was enacted in the years leading up to 
World War II, cutting off any sale of military weaponry to belligerents. Unlike other export 
controls that distinguish allies and enemies, the Neutrality Act prevented the United States from 
exporting arms to any belligerent in ongoing conflicts throughout the world. Devised to inhibit 
Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia, this law was ultimately applied to other countries as war broke out 
in Europe and throughout the world. To the chagrin of President Roosevelt, the law made it 
difficult for the United States to provide aid to American allies, at least prior to America’s direct 
involvement in the war (Weiss, 1968).  
Post–World War II Export Restrictions 
The end of the Second World War ushered in a new regime. Previously, restrictions were 
imposed on the basis of country (Trading with the Enemy Act) or product (Neutrality Act). 
However, in the post-war environment, a more mixed approach was deemed necessary. The 
Export Control Act of 1949 was the beginning of this new era of export controls; focused 
primarily on restricting trade with Soviet-bloc countries. 
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The act had three primary control criteria. First, scarce goods were barred from export if their 
export could have a negative impact on the American economy. Second, Presidents could impose 
restrictions on items that could be used to build weapons of mass destruction, violate human 
rights, or improve the state of foreign missile technology. Third, restrictions were implemented 
to help ensure national security, barring export of items or information that could “make a 
significant contribution to the military capability of any country that posed a threat to the 
national security of the United States” (Fergusson, 2005, p. 2). Together, these restrictions led to 
what became a very restrictive system. Fergusson (2005), of the Congressional Research Service, 
described the regime as a “near-embargo” (p. 2)  
When the Export Administration Act (EAA) was passed in 1969, there were major changes in 
how the export restriction regime functioned due, in part, to pressure from the business 
community, which saw removing some of these restrictions as a potential opportunity to 
jumpstart a slumping economy. However, the most noticeable change was the replacement of the 
word “control” with “administration.” Although this change carried no practical difference, it 
“reflected an easing of tensions between East and West” (Dorsett, 1993, p. 21). More 
substantively, the act attempted to coordinate the U.S. control list, so that it would be closely 
aligned with the West’s joint export control venture, known as the Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) list. However, the United States’ list remained largely 
intact. 
It is worth noting that prior to the EAA, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which 
imposed restrictions specifically aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons material and 
technology. The act restricted the sale of nuclear technology for the development of nuclear 
weapons. However, working with other countries to develop peaceful nuclear programs was 
allowed (Borich, 2001). 
Current Export Policies 
The current restrictions on exports are mostly derived from a series of laws passed during the 
1970s, during the height of the Cold War. However, the national security environment has 
changed dramatically in the intervening 40-plus years. The end of the Cold War marked the 
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starting point of an American security transition. With no clear peer rival, the United States 
expedited efforts to downsize its military forces in the 1990s to take advantage of the “peace 
dividend.” Some even wrote of the end of history, inferring that mankind had reached the 
pinnacle of ideological evolution since the largest threat to the democratic principles of the 
United States had collapsed and left the U.S. as the world’s lone superpower (Fukuyama, 1989).   
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the global defense industry underwent significant 
consolidation to adjust to the new global arms market (Gansler, 2011). Today, following this 
widespread consolidation, only six of 50 major U.S.-based contractors from 1990 remain in 
business (when BAE, a U.K.-headquartered firm, is included); of those, only two (Boeing and 
Lockheed Martin) produce fixed-wing aircraft. In similar fashion, Europe’s defense firms 
consolidated, and today only a few remain—including BAE Systems; European Aeronautic, 
Defense, and Space Company (EADS); Thales, Finmeccanica, Saab, and Dessault.   
This consolidation rationalized the overall capacity and increased the efficiency of the 
surviving firms by combining their operations, thus allowing for significant cost savings. As a 
result of the increasingly reduced domestic competition within the consolidated industrial base, 
DoD officials recognized the need to expand the U.S. defense industrial base from solely 
domestic suppliers to a global one.   
The United States continues to dominate this market with large research and development 
(R&D) investments ($80 billion versus approximately $12 billion for all of the European 
Union countries combined). Globalization enables a more efficient integration of the sources of 
supply but, at the same time, elevates the significance of sales to foreign markets. Furthermore, 
with the anticipated reduced defense expenditures, maintaining an autarkic defense industry is 
simply unaffordable. European defense companies were forced to face this in the mid-1990s 
and responded with several cross-border mergers. They formed several trans-European firms, 
such as EADS, because their domestic markets were too small. These firms can now 
effectively compete against U.S. firms, as was demonstrated in 2012 with the competition for 
the U.S. Air Force tankers between Boeing and EADS.  
In this new global environment, regulations aimed at restricting imports and exports hinder the 
ability of the DoD to experience the advantages enabled by globalization in the 21st century.   
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Once the Soviet Union dissolved, the motivation behind decades of military modernization and 
Cold War national security policy no longer existed. However, the illusion of a long-lived peace 
was short-lived, and in the early 1990s, the U.S. was engaged in a very different conflict, the first 
Gulf War. Then, on September 11, 2001, the country’s threat landscape again changed 
dramatically. The events of that day created a new urgency for America’s defense establishment 
and laid the foundation for the adjustment of the DoD to the new global security environment. 
This adjustment proved especially vital, as the threats now addressed by the DoD were vastly 
different than the ones it faced during the previous five decades. The United States now faced 
increasing threats emanating from terrorists often based in weak and failing states, a diffusion of 
power and military capabilities to non-state actors, increasing unpredictability about the locations 
of conflict, and increasing potential for miscalculation and surprise. Thus, many of the existing 
policies restricting exports, developed in response to the Soviet Union, are outdated and 
unnecessarily restrictive, even if, at their inception, they were well-intentioned and appropriate.  
Today’s most important export regulatory authorities, the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), both derive from the 
Cold War era. Together, they have provided the basis for an evolving framework. The legislation 
leading to the creation of these regulatory regimes is described below. 
• Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976—grants the President the power to control the 
export of defense products and services. The act mandated the creation of the ITAR 
(detailed in the next section). The principal objective of the act was to ensure that exports 
of defense systems and services are used solely for legitimate defensive purposes. 
Therefore, decisions under AECA are meant to “take into account whether the export of 
an article would contribute to an arms race; aid in the development of weapons of mass 
destruction; support international terrorism; increase the possibility of outbreak or 
escalation of conflict; or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms 
control or nonproliferation agreements or other arrangements” (United States Congress, 
1976). A secondary objective is to restrict the export of certain sensitive materials, such 
that they are only available to trusted countries after a strict licensing process and 
thorough documentation, as well as other requirements such as not transferring the 
technologies to any other country. 
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Although ITAR is the oft-cited method for enforcement of AECA provisions, another 
method exists within the law; namely, if the president becomes aware of a potential 
“substantial violation” of AECA, he is required to report it to Congress. Then, Congress 
can, by resolution, determine that a violation has occurred. If this were to occur, the 
offending country could no longer purchase from the United States; in addition, all 
existing agreements, payments, shipments, and so forth, would be terminated. However, 
this provision has never been exercised (Grimmett, 2005). 
Punishments for violations can be very stiff. If criminal intent is determined, both an 
institution and an individual can face fines up to $1,000,000 per violation; individuals can 
even receive more severe penalties, up to ten years in prison, either in place of, or in 
addition to, a fine. If a violation is considered to be a civil violation rather than a criminal 
one, the fine per violation is reduced to a maximum of $500,000 for both institutions and 
individuals, with no risk of jail time (Vice Provost and Dean of Research, Stanford 
University, n.d.). There are other potential penalties; for example, both people and 
institutions can have goods seized, and both can be debarred from future exporting. 
Currently, there are 467 individuals and institutions disbarred for AECA/ITAR violations 
(Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, 2012). 
• International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977—authorizes the 
President to take actions to regulate commerce in the case of a declared national 
emergency. Potential actions include blocking transactions or freezing assets, and, if 
attacked, actually seizing the assets of the aggressor. In effect, the IEEPA gives the 
President the authority to cut off trade with certain states, non-state actors, and groups of 
individuals. 
Presidents have exercised their authority under the IEEPA on numerous occasions. For 
example, Iran has been deemed a threat since 1979, due to its continued support for 
terrorism, as has Zimbabwe, since 2003, for suppressing democracy. With regard to non-
state actors, a wide range of qualifications have been used, including those engaged in the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorists trying to undermine the Middle East 
peace process, and people contributing to the violence in the Democratic Republic of the 
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Congo. Interestingly, when the EAA of 1979 nearly expired in 1984, President Reagan 
reauthorized it by declaring an emergency under IEEPA. When it actually did expire in 
1994, President Clinton (and all subsequent Presidents) authorized it in the same way. 
Punishments for violations of IEEPA are also very strict. Criminal penalties can amount 
to $1,000,000 fines for both institutions and individuals and may include up to twenty 
years in prison. Civil penalties include a fine $250,000 or twice the value of the 
transaction, whichever is greater. Other punishments, including the denial of future 
exports and seizure of goods, are also possible (Vice Provost and Dean of Research, 
Stanford University, n.d.). 
• Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979—is reauthorized annually by the President 
under IEEPA. The act was a derivation of the 1969 act by the same name and focuses 
primarily on dual-use items (i.e., items that have both commercial and military 
applicability). Unlike the earlier version, the 1979 act included the provision that if an 
item was so prevalent abroad, and of a quality comparable to what would be exported 
from the United States such that trying to control it would be a futile exercise, then it 
should not be controlled. This decision is made by the Secretary of Commerce. This 
change was a concession to business interests that felt the law, at times, unfairly restricted 
trade, even though its control would have no noticeable effect on the goal of restricting 
access to these items.  
 
Violations of the EAA regulations also carry stiff penalties. Since the EAA was extended 
(using the IEEPA emergency powers), the penalties are the same as those described 
above. Should Congress reauthorize the EAA, the penalties authorized therein would take 
effect once again. EAA violations fall into three categories, “willful violations,”1 
                                                
 
 
1 Willful violations are commonly defined as a voluntary act in complete disregard or indifference to the regulations. 
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“knowing violations,”2 and civil violations. For willful violations, penalties on 
institutions include a fine of $1,000,000, or five times the value of the exports, whichever 
is greater; and for individuals the penalty is $250,000 and/or ten years imprisonment per 
violation. Knowing violations carry a penalty of either $50,000 or five times the value of 
the exports for institutions; for individuals, the fine is the same and the prison term is five 
years. Civil penalties under EAR include a $12,000 fine per violation, unless the item is 
controlled for national security, in which case the violation carries a $120,000 fine. As 
with the other laws, denial of export3 and seizure of goods are also possible punishments, 








                                                
 
 
2 Knowing violations are appropriate when the individual or institution knew the regulations (or should have known 
the regulations because they were effectively communicated), the trade was in violation of the regulations, and they 
knew that the trade was occurring in that fashion. The main difference with a willful violation is the intent—a 
willful violation occurs when the rules are blatantly ignored, whereas a knowing violation could be accidental. 
3 Presently, there are 445 people on BIS’s Denied Persons List—the list of people with whom one cannot trade. 
However, there are several duplicates, as well as incarcerated persons who would not be able to trade anyway 
(Bureau of Industry and Security, 2012). 
Figure 1. ITAR vs. EAR controls (MIT OSP) 
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Together, these laws provide a framework that governs the U.S. export control system. However, 
it is the regulatory structures created to enforce these laws—the International Trade in Arms 
Regulations and the Export Administration Regulations—that determine which items should be 
protected (See Figure 1). 
Export Regulatory Authorities 
AECA and EAA rely on regulatory mechanisms for enforcement (unlike IEEPA), namely the 
ITAR, administered by the Department of State, and the EAR, administered by the Bureau of 
Industry and Science within the Department of Commerce (DoC). These organizations develop 
the lists of controlled exports in each category, determine which applicants receive licenses, and 
punish those who violate the law. These institutions follow different processes and have different 
controlled items. Accordingly, exporters must be thoroughly familiar with the regulations in 
order to determine which regulatory regime a product falls under; in other words, the exporters 
themselves are required to determine which agency to approach to successfully and legally 
export their products. The ITAR and EAR are described below. 
• International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR)—the set of regulations built around the 
AECA dealing primarily with national security and, expressly, defense-related items and 
services. The products regulated include weapon systems (e.g., aircraft, tanks, etc.) but 
also include subsystems or components critical to military systems. The determining 
factors are listed as follows: 
a. Is it specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted, or modified for a 
military application, and 
• does not have predominant civil applications, and 
• does not have performance equivalent (defined by form, fit and function) to 
those of an article or service used for civil applications; or 
b. Is it specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted, or modified for a 
military application, and has significant military or intelligence applicability such 
that control under this subchapter is necessary? (ITAR, part 120) 
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As mentioned, this list, and enforcement of it, is controlled by the Department of State. 
The process of complying with the ITAR is long and rather complicated. Many goods 
that may not be instantly recognizable as a product controlled under ITAR may, in fact, 
be subject to the regulations. And fines for violations can be massive—up to $1 million 
per company per violation, and up to $250,000 per person per violation, as well as up to 
10 years in prison (Buetow, 2005). With these stiff penalties, even the smallest infraction 
can become a major problem for companies. 
In order to remain in compliance when exporting products that potentially fall under 
ITAR regulations, the exporter is required to navigate a demanding licensing process that 
can take a significant amount of time and resources. These licenses are issued for the 
item, not for the order; thus, “on a single purchase order some products may require a 


























Moreover, the list, known as the U.S. Munitions List (USML), is not a list of products so 
much as a list of categories, descriptions, and rules to determine whether or not a product 
should be controlled. For example, one such category is major weapons systems. Note, 
however, that the category includes “all components used in the items covered by this 
category if they were specifically developed or modified for military applications” 
(USML, Part 121). Often, the State Department has to conduct a lengthy review in order 
to determine whether the component in question was initially created for a specific 
military use. The State Department will also attempt to determine whether the end 
product is for “military use,” that is, will “be used in a military way for offensive or 


































Sometimes, it may not be clear whether an item is covered by the USML. In order to help 
make a determination, an exporter can request a Commodity Jurisdiction (CJ) letter. The 
exporter submits a detailed technical description of the item to the State Department, 
which, in turn, conducts a cross-agency review to determine whether it, or the Commerce 
Department, has jurisdiction over the product in question. The final result is a CJ letter, 
which informs the exporter which agency, if any, has the authority to regulate the item. 
• Export Administration Regulations (EAR)—regulations governed by the DoC’s Bureau of 
Industry and Security (BIS) fall under the Commerce Control List (CCL). The EAR, 
unlike ITAR, is focused on dual-use products and classified under both the CCL and the 
anti-boycott provisions of the EAA. The BIS uses a simpler set of rules than does the 










In order for the exporter to obtain a preliminary assessment, the BIS provides a flowchart 
that walks one through the process of determining licensing requirements (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. BIS Flow Chart 
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“The flowchart contains steps covering commodity classification; ‘bad guy and country’ 
checklist reviews; and whether an export license is required” (Cheadle, 2005, p. 84). 
In order to grant a license, the Commerce Department carries out an inter-departmental 
process wherein the Department carries out the evaluation but with the input and support 
of other agencies, in particular, the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy. If no 
outside agency input is needed, the DoC can either inform the applicant that a license is 
not required, or approve or deny the request. Should the Commerce Department 
determine that another agency’s review is necessary, there is a timeline for the agency to 
return its recommendation. Within 10 days, the agency may request further information 
or details; within 30 days, the agency needs to either recommend approval or denial of 
the license. If it chooses to give no feedback, the agency is seen as having no objection to 
whatever decision the BIS/Commerce Department chooses (Fergusson, 2005).!!
There is also a three-part process by which the previous licensing decision can be 
disputed. First, one can appeal to the Operating Committee, staffed by representatives of 
the Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, and Energy, as well as representatives 
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Intelligence Community. Next, one can appeal to 
the Advisory Committee of Export Policy, consisting of the Assistant Secretary of 
Commerce for Export Administration, the chair, and the appropriate assistant secretaries 
and officials from the aforementioned departments. Then, the matter can be brought 
before the Export Administration Review Board; chaired by the Secretary of Commerce 
and consisting of the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy, as well as having the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Director of Central Intelligence as non-voting 
members. Finally, should this not resolve the dispute, the President may make a final 
decision. For each level of appeal, there is a time limit on how much time is allowed; the 
one exception is the presidential decision. In total, everything short of a presidential 
















The United States does not use restrictions on imports in the same way as on exports. Rather than 
rely on lists, the restrictions are based on the expressed preference for American goods over 
imported goods, particularly in a few classes. Also, unlike export restriction laws, which have 
evolved significantly over time, to the point where their original content is practically 
undetectable, import restrictions have undergone less tumultuous changes; in fact, the original 
laws are still largely in effect. These laws are also not as complex as export control laws, but 
pertain to a far greater number of items. Below, we describe the two primary import restriction 






















The Buy American Act 
The Buy American Act, passed in 1933, was rooted in the belief 
that by increasing the government purchase of domestic goods, 
the United States could lift itself out of the Great Depression. 
As its name implies, the act gave preferential treatment to the 
use of American-made products. Today, the act contains three 
original sections and two additional ones. 
Section 1 requires that when procuring materials and 
manufactured items for public use, the items in question must be American-made unless the cost 
is unreasonable; the item is to be used outside of the United States; domestic supplies are not 
available in sufficient quantity or quality; or if purchasing the item domestically might somehow 
oppose the public interest. The determination of whether or not one of these exceptions applies is 
at the discretion of the agency head. However, the cost consideration is dictated by a 1934 
Treasury Department directive, which defines “unreasonable” as a minimum of 25% over the 
cost of the foreign product (Hirschman, 1998, p. 10). 
Section 2 targets contractors rather than the government. It stipulates that when performing 
“construction, alteration, and repair work, on public buildings or public work,” American 
materials must be used (Hirschman, 1998, p. 11). As with the agency restrictions, there are 
exemptions for cost and public interest. Again, interpreting and imposing these exceptions is at 
the determination of the agency head. Should a contractor violate this section, however, the 
penalty is debarment for three years.  
Section 3 merely defines the terms used in other sections of the law. Section 4 was a later 
addition to the law, passed in 1949, to clarify intent. This section reiterates that the use of 
domestic materials is a requirement, unless an exception is granted. It also states that domestic 
goods manufactured using foreign raw materials are equal (with regard to the law) to those made 
with domestic materials if, and when, domestic materials are not available. However, this section 
failed to clarify the definition of “public interest,” a term that many agency heads found difficult 
to interpret, let alone to apply (Hirschman, 1998). 
Figure 3. Buy American Act 
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The final section consisted of an executive order from President Eisenhower and is considered to 
be the act’s “most significant and practical alteration” (Hirschman, 1998, p. 12). Executive Order 
10582 established interpretation guidelines for use when applying the Buy American Act to 
contract actions, largely considered the important missing piece. Rather than each agency relying 
on its own interpretation of the regulations, Section 5 standardized numerous terms. For 
example, the term “foreign made” was defined as any item for which 50% of its value originates 
from abroad. It also reinforced the authority of the head of the agency to determine whether 
accepting a domestic bid over a foreign one might harm the national interest. Section 5 also 
granted special consideration to ‘small business concerns’ and suppliers who will ‘produce 
substantially all’ of their product in a labor-surplus area” (Hirschman, 1998, p. 14). 
Reviews of the Buy American Act are mixed. Although some see it as a necessary step toward 
protecting American business, others do not think it has worked as intended. Says Hirschman 
(1998), “The Buy American Act appears to have been poorly planned, hastily passed, and 
inconsistently enforced” (p. 23). Hirschman largely blames poor definitions, lack of standard 
rules, and general vagueness. Indeed, many companies find it difficult to interpret the 
regulations. For example, in 2011, Home Depot was sued by its competitors for allegedly selling 
Chinese goods (such as power tools) to the United States government, in contradiction of the 
Buy American Act. Home Depot, for its part, rejected the claims, saying if they did sell foreign 
goods it was unintentional, but this still prompted an investigation (Little, 2011). 
The Berry Amendment 
Another statute related to the 
government procurement of foreign 
goods is the Berry Amendment. While 
the Buy American Act gives preference 
to domestic products over foreign 
products with certain exceptions, the Berry Amendment overrides these exceptions for particular 
items, namely food, clothing, and specialty metals. However, whereas the Buy American Act 
applies to all government contracting, the Berry Amendment applies only to defense contracting. 
In addition, whereas the act covers only procurement within the United States, the Berry 
                Figure 4: Berry Amendment Compliance 
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Amendment is enforced worldwide. Finally, unlike the Buy American Act, which defines the 
term “substantially all” as no more than 50% of a product, the Amendment requires that 100% of 
the product be American made (Grasso, 2005). 
In force since 1941, the Berry Amendment was actually an amendment to the Fifth Supplemental 
Defense Department Appropriations Act and has been altered multiple times since. This 
regulation maintains that the DoD “give preference in procurement to domestically produced, 
manufactured, or homegrown products; notably food, clothing, fabrics, and specialty metals” 
(Grasso, 2005, p. i). However, exceptions were later added when food, specialty metals, and 
measuring tools were used for contingency operations and in instances of compelling urgency 
(Grasso, 2005).  
The Berry Amendment requires that certain items be from domestic sources; however, this 
requirement extends to all of the item’s components as well. Accordingly, clothing, explicitly 
listed as a controlled item, must be produced in the United States, as must all of the cotton or 
other cloth materials, natural or synthetic, that are part of the product. This regulation goes 
beyond clothing; for example, if the DoD is trying to obtain cotton swabs, then the cotton must 
be of American origin. The requirement applies to the items being grown, reprocessed, reused, 
and produced. 
Acquisition officials must consider the Berry Amendment for every single acquisition. This 
includes requesting confirmation from the vendor that the material, component, or system is 
compliant, and they must maintain a written record of this confirmation, should problems arise. 
Ensuring that the contractor fully understands the requirements and rules of the Berry 
Amendment is critical to its effectiveness. Once the contract is awarded, DoD officials can 
continue to monitor the project and remind the vendors of the risks (namely, cancellation of the 
contract, debarment, and legal action) if noncompliance is discovered. In the case of 
noncompliance, various actions must be taken, including notifying legal counsel, verifying that a 














The Berry Amendment, however, does not always apply. First, when a purchase falls under the 
Simplified Acquisition Threshold—currently set at $150,000 (Electronic Code of Federal 
Regulations, 2012)—a one-time purchase from a prime contractor typically qualifies for an 
exemption. Second, when goods are not available in sufficient quantities at the domestic market 
price, the Non-Availability Exception may be invoked, although requirements for the exception 
must be narrowly defined. Third, foreign procurements for current combat operations (presently 
limited to the Middle East and Afghanistan) are exempt from all restrictions under the Berry 
Amendment. Fourth, contingency operations (operations in which the Secretary of Defense 
determines that American troops might see combat as part of an operation) are exempt from 
Berry Amendment controls as they relate to food and measuring tools. Fifth, emergency 
acquisitions (again restricted to food and hand or measuring tools) and “urgent and compelling” 





















are exempt from the restrictions. Seventh, goods meant for commissary resale, including at stores 
on bases and on-board ships, are exempt. Eighth, qualifying countries can sell their specified 
goods to the DoD without restriction. 
Food items also carry their own exemptions. First, perishable food traveling to overseas locations 
is exempt from the Berry Amendment controls for obvious logistical reasons. Second, processed 
foods may have components of foreign or unknown origins, although “significant processing” 
must have occurred in the United States.  
Summary 
Current laws have proven quite effective in providing a reasonable level of control over certain 
technologies and information by stemming the flow of American defense technology to other 
countries. These laws have also successfully isolated certain countries and prevented them from 
acquiring weapons that could hurt American interests, while granting our close allies significant 
access to our technology and expertise to enhance their own defense, and to help us fighting 
together in a coalition.  
The current regime has also allowed the United States to retain certain technologies solely for its 
own use. Obviously, this is, in part, due to the classified nature of some projects. Take, for 
example, the top-secret, stealthy Black Hawk helicopter, the existence of which was only 
publicly known after a technical malfunction that caused it to crash during the military raid on 
Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan (Ross, 2011). The helicopter was only partially 
destroyed. At the same time, however, agencies often withhold licenses for certain products or 
specifically ban the export of certain items or information. Even though we trust our allies with a 
number of controlled items, some items, however, are simply believed to be too sensitive. Often, 
export restrictions are only applied to components within a system; for example, new technology 
used in American fighter jets may be subject to export restriction. The United States will use the 
technology in the U.S. procured aircraft; however, countries wishing to purchase the aircraft 
would receive versions that use an alternative, more common technology. 
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Some items, although not intended for general distribution, are sold to our allies and friends. 
Even though we sell them for their use, we would not want them to be later transferred to an 
enemy or a competitor who might then use, or threaten to use, these technologies against us or 
our allies; or gain knowledge to exploit weaknesses in American systems. The current regime 
has evolved to include stipulations against transfers to third parties without authorization.  
Current laws can be applied in order to cut off and isolate countries that violate norms or pose a 
threat. Under ITAR and EAR, sales contracts on some goods, in addition to the requirement that 
retransfer be approved, will specifically state that some countries are off limits. IEEPA has been 
used to create even more restrictions under the President’s authority to restrict commerce in an 
emergency situation. This power has been used to blacklist certain countries. Examples include 






Despite the restrictions, our allies are still able to purchase the weapons systems that they need 
from the United States. In fact, the United States is the largest producer and exporter of defense 
goods in the world, supplying dozens of countries with a range of defense and military products. 
On the import side, the United States is capable of designing and manufacturing the vast majority 
of military systems upon which it relies. However, import restrictions impede the United States’ 
ability to acquire defense-related goods as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible. The 
problem here is two-fold. The DoD is hampered from acquiring foreign suppliers’ products—
products that are not only cheaper, but in some instances, technically superior. Secondly, the 
waiver process complicates matters further, creating needless delays for products that may not 
even be available domestically. Clearly, the current regime is far from perfect. Below, we discuss 
some of the more pressing challenges associated with current export and import regulations. 
1. Restrictions on dual-use technologies 
Much to the chagrin of American business, the ability of American companies to export certain 
goods, including non-defense goods, has been curtailed significantly. Restrictions on dual use 
items are particularly troubling. Many such items were initially developed by the military but 
now are in widespread use, including powerful microchips and computers, but also mundane 
items, like the metal bolts used to build satellites (Avery, 2012). Many items under ITAR 
controls are not top-secret technology; rather, they are very similar to commercial non-controlled 
items. Take, for example, the M1 Abrams tank’s brake pads, which are “virtually identical to 
brake pads for fire trucks;” however, unlike those for fire trucks, the ones designed for tanks 
were controlled under the USML. Prior to changes to the USML implemented by President 
Obama in 2010, the brake pads received the same level of protection as the tank itself (Office of 
the White House Press Secretary, 2010). 
Importantly, today in many areas of advanced technology the commercial world is ahead of the 
defense sector, so the DoD increasingly is adopting many commercial items for incorporation in 
















Ironically, commercial variants of military technology are sometimes more tightly controlled 
than the military technology itself, or so it appears. A 2008 DoC study indicated that U.S. 
exports of imaging and sensor products increased significantly from $280 million in 2001 to 
$462 million in 2005. In 2005, roughly 12% of total revenue was derived from exports. Night-
vision devices and cooled infrared imaging systems—used predominantly in military systems—
were the two largest export categories (Department of Commerce [DoC], 2008). During the same 
























precipitously, from $55 million to $20 million (DoC, 2008). The Institute for Defense Analysis 
(IDA) concluded that “export controls are a negative factor on the competitive position of U.S. 
firms in this segment” (IDA, 2008, p. 29). Some U.S. companies have stopped exporting certain 
commercial infrared products altogether. It simply is not worth their effort given foreign 
customers’ “displeasure” with U.S. export controls and the willingness of European firms to 
meet the foreign demand (IDA, 2008, p. 29). Even if export controls for commercial infrared 
products are relaxed, there is now some question as to whether the U.S. industry will be able to 
“catch up” with European suppliers in order to be competitive. 
2. Long delays for approval 
Business deals with foreign firms involving any type of controlled good or information must be 
approved in advance. Often, the approval process can take several months. In fact, without the 
appropriate license, even approaching the foreign firm may be illegal. In some instances, making 
a telephone call to a foreign company requires pre-approval. Needless to say, many international 
business opportunities are hindered as a result (Oliver, 2001), which, in turn, diminishes the 
United States’ technological edge, by reducing demand for its high-tech products. 
Because the licensing procedures are typically based on whether the product falls on a particular 
list—and often do not take into account the destination country—even our closest allies are 
subjected to lengthy licensing procedures that can harm their interests, as well as our own. That 
only 1% of all export requests are rejected (and far fewer from our allies) indicates that the 
process may be doing more harm than good. Some countries (e.g., Canada) have long enjoyed a 
special status that allows them greater access to American defense goods. This status has only 
recently been extended to the United Kingdom and Australia.  
An independent group of DoD advisers (the Task Group on Best Practices for Export Controls) 
found that the “processes are causing lengthy review times and prompting slow decision-
making,” which “has a negative impact on the U.S. private sector and foreign governments who 
desire to trade technology and defense items with the U.S” (Defense Business Board, 2008, p. 2). 
Moreover, the State Department reportedly uses an all-paper system, and the DoC uses systems 
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not significantly updated since 1987. It is not surprising that it takes an average of four to six 
months to process license requests (Defense Industry Daily, 2011).  
Navigating complex export regulations can be especially challenging during active, joint military 
engagements, when materials are urgently necessary. During the NATO mission in Kosovo, for 
instance, the United States military did not have sufficient base space or munitions and sought to 
use Italian bases and equipment in order to fully participate in the mission. This made sense, 
considering that similar missions had been coordinated in the past, often with Italian and 
American planes flying side-by-side. The greatest threat to these types of joint missions was 
surface-to-air missiles, against which the best defense was flares ejected from the rear of the 
aircraft. 
The United States produces some of the best flares available. During the mission to Kosovo, 
Italy sought to purchase flares from the United States, and there was, in fact, a large stockpile 
already in storage on the base. But because the flares were considered a protected item, approval 
was required, which was arbitrarily rejected.  
3. Fewer opportunities for joint research 
The current regime greatly hinders the opportunity to engage in joint research. American 
institutions are limited, as are foreign employees and students. Combined, these issues are 
making it harder for the U.S. to have significant technological advancements, thus eroding our 
previously large technological advantage over our adversaries (Chakrabarti, 2009). Since 
information is controlled by both ITAR and EAR, new knowledge emerging from American 
universities can require a license for export. In fact, simply passing the information to a foreign 
national living in the United States is considered a “deemed export.” Under the current 
regulations, companies and universities may be required to obtain an export license before 
releasing controlled dual-use technology, or source code subject to the EAR, to a foreign national 
who is not a permanent resident of the United States (or a member of certain groups of protected 
individuals, such as asylum holders). Consequently, the transfer of technology within the U.S., to 
a foreign national, may be considered an export to his or her home country. As one might 
imagine, such a status engenders many complications for foreign students who want to study 
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advanced technology and science. Indeed, even being in a classroom when a controlled technical 
procedure is discussed, may be considered a violation. As a result, very promising students are 
deterred from pursuing a technology-focused education in the United States, to the detriment of 
the American commercial and defense industries. Recognizing the large number of foreign 
students in the top U.S. research universities (in the science and technology fields), President 
Reagan decided (in Presidential Decision Directive 189) that “fundamental research” should be 
open to all, regardless of nationality, and that the research should be freely published, so as to 
maximize the economic and security benefits.  
However, there are still problems when it comes to “applied research.” Take, for example, the 
case of J. Reece Roth, a retired professor from the University of Tennessee. He allegedly shared 
information he had obtained, while working on an Air Force project, with students in his class 
from Iran and China. Despite his argument that he was unaware of the violations and unaware 
that the information was even on the USML, he was convicted and sentenced to four years in jail 
and two years of probation (Burke, 2012, p. 52). 
4. Technology outpaces the regulations 
Revisions of the regulations and the control lists are rare, whereas technology advancements are 
constant and regular. This delay means that the regulations fall even further behind, as 
technology advances, making the system even more inadequate as time passes. Thus, much of 
the new technology is not properly protected, and old technology that has become ubiquitous is 
controlled unnecessarily. 
In the modern era, communicating via email can lead to violations of U.S. export policy. When 
an email is sent from a user in the United States to another user in the United States, the email is 
routed through central servers. Transit to these servers takes the path of least resistance, which 
includes transit abroad, since the servers may be located overseas. An email containing an 
attachment with information on even basic plans for a weapons system can technically result in a 



















































5. Regulations damage relationships with allies 
The current regime may be hurting U.S. relationships with allies. Oliver (2001) notes that 
“Potential allies do not view restricting technology that would enable their citizens to have a 
higher standard of living or more security as the act of an America who wants to have friends” 
(p. 5). Our allies may resent when we require that they obtain licenses—let alone when we reject 
them—because these actions hinder their ability to develop, from both an economic and security 
perspective (Oliver, 2001). 
6. Lack of competition results in higher prices 
Import regulations have been successful in their stated purpose of limiting the use of foreign 
products in government contracting. The primary goal of the import control system—protection 
of American manufacturers and producers of certain goods from foreign competition—has, in a 
sense, been successful in that it has supported American businesses that would otherwise lose 
contracts to imported goods that are often cheaper, better, or both. But the policies have had 
unintended consequences. For instance, the cost of hiring contractors is significantly higher than 
might otherwise be the case, because of the lack of competition from abroad. In addition, foreign 























7. Interruptions in the supply chain 
A 2004 study by the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy 
examined 12 major DoD programs and found that 4.3% of the value of the contracts came from 
































should be noted that the foreign parts were used not because they were cheaper (although they 
often were) but because they were better. Additionally, in contradiction to the aforementioned 
concerns, the report states that this finding has “not negatively impacted long-term readiness or 
national security” (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy, 2004, p. v). 
Instead, the report cites it as a benefit, as it allows the DoD to access foreign technologies, 
encourages interoperable systems with allies, improves foreign access for U.S. firms, and ensures 
competition that helps American industry innovate (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Industrial Policy, 2004, p. v). Not all authors on this subject agree, however, that the military’s 
use of foreign parts is necessarily beneficial. Foreign dependency could be construed as a 
potential risk to American security. According to the Defense Science Board, all DoD purchases 
have “some commercial or foreign parts” (Defense Science Board Task Force on Integrating 
Commercial Systems into the DOD, Effectively and Efficiently, 2009, p. xiii). Clearly, the 
interruption of availability of foreign parts due to international events is potential cause for 
concern. However, this is generally mitigated by the fact that these suppliers are allies (e.g., the 
top five suppliers of aerospace imports in 2011, which account for over 70%, are France, 
Canada, the U.K., Japan, and Germany; International Trade Administration, 2011). As for other 
suppliers, the United States could stockpile adequate quantities of parts and materials so as to 
minimize the impact of any interruptions.  
8. Increasing cybersecurity threats  
Virtually all weapon system components, as well as business systems use software extensively. 
Moreover, software development is now also a global industry, and some of the software used by 
the DoD and the defense industry has been, at least in part, developed abroad. This can include 
countries that may be motivated to exploit and/or manipulate software. This can potentially result 
in the theft of information and intellectual property, the destruction of information systems, or 
even the destruction of a physical system.  
For example, the National Center for Computational Engineering at the University of Tennessee 
recently purchased technology from Huawei, a Chinese technology firm with close ties to the 
People’s Liberation Army. This lab works directly on national security issues, conducting 
simulated flight tests for both military aircraft and spacecraft, as well as simulating submarine 
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warfare. Clearly, this type of information, if acquired by peer competitors, could be exploited in 
a variety of ways. In fact, the U.S. government had reason to believe that Huawei had the 
capability to capture this information through imbedded components of the system that were sold 
to the University. Moreover, a House Intelligence Committee report claimed that Huawei and 
fellow Chinese company, ZTE, had engaged in espionage of this sort in the past (Schmidt, 
Bradsher, & Hauser, 2012). 
Beyond the cybersecurity risk, economic risks were also an important factor to those who were 
protesting this use of Huawei technology. The company, the House report noted, received 
substantial subsidies from the Chinese government, providing it with a substantial advantage 





There is a clear need for both import and export controls; however, the current system definitely 
has significant flaws that negatively impact economic growth and national security. Correcting 
these issues requires a strong plan of action to revamp and re-imagine the control system. Import 
and export controls are clearly necessary in order to ensure the protection of American military 
technology as well as the health of the defense industry. However, the current regime must be 
revised to take advantage of the globalized economy while addressing the challenges cited in the 
previous section. Below, we provide our recommendations. 
• The lists of regulated items should be combined and simplified. 
Exporters are not always sure whether their product is on the USML, the CCL, or 
regulated through some other mechanism, creating confusion and errors. A master list 
would greatly aid the process. Creating a single list would require significant 
commitment on the part of the U.S. government. All redundancies would have to be 
eliminated. First, however, policymakers would have to determine which items actually 
require protection. The removal of thousands of items will act to free up some of the 
backlog in the system, thereby facilitating the creation of a new list. However, the list 
must be frequently updated to take care of the rapidly changing situations (e.g., regarding 
technology, available for foreign goods, etc.).  
• Defense-related items should be assigned to categories based on their level of sensitivity.  
Presently, all items are treated equally. This results in tank brake pads, identical to those 
used on fire trucks, being controlled just as stringently as the tank’s complex targeting 
systems or the entire tank itself. This distracts from protecting goods that could actually 
impact national security. 
Policymakers should consider creating a system similar to security clearances for 
domestic national security workers. Items on the newly merged USML/CCL could be 
given a designation for a level of protection, similar to the classification of government 
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documents, which includes the categories top secret, secret, confidential, and 
unclassified.  
• Export decisions should be based, in part, on the status of a country’s relationship with 
the United States. 
Our close allies, such as Britain, France, Australia, the Netherlands, and so forth, should 
not be required to navigate an onerous process in order to obtain licenses for each and 
every defense-related product that they order from the United States. As previously 
discussed, current policy hampers our relationship with our allies, fosters resentment, and 
reduces our allies’ desire to share technology developments with us. Because the 
overwhelming majority of licenses requested are from U.S. allies, and for items that are 
not particularly risky, this would free up significant resources necessary to expedite the 
approval of other licenses, which will make exporting more efficient overall. And, 
because almost all of the license requests of this type are already being approved, this 
policy would not create significant security vulnerabilities. 
Corresponding to the designations assigned to “defense-related goods,” countries should 
be assigned to categories based on the status of their relationship (e.g., most trusted, 
trusted, less trusted, least trusted) with the United States. To borrow from the security 
clearance scheme once again, an individual with a secret clearance can only gain access 
to documents marked secret or below. (Perhaps for geopolitical sensitivity reasons this 
could be coded as category A, B, C, or D—and used as an incentive for countries to 
control their third country exports, for example.) Similarly, a country with a mid-level 
clearance could import items of certain designations without a license. Under this type of 
system, countries would be able to understand what will be required to import certain 
goods from the U.S. prior to beginning what is today a long and complex process. Under 
this system, American regulators and lawmakers could allow license-free exports of 
certain goods to certain countries without allowing open exporting and yet, more 
carefully controlling which countries can obtain which defense products. 
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• The United States should not unilaterally impose controls on commercial variants of 
defense-related goods for which it is not the sole supplier.  
 
If the United States believes that certain defense-related products should be barred from 
export, it must seek multilateral participation; otherwise, an embargo that is imposed 
unilaterally will be ineffective, not to mention costly to American companies. As alluded 
to earlier, U.S restrictions on the export of commercial infrared devices led to decreased 
revenues for American firms, while boosting the profits of European firms (for which the 
export of infrared devices was less restrictive). Needless to say, the world is not safer 
simply because the U.S. stopped selling commercial infrared devices to foreign buyers. 
 
• Protectionist import restrictions should be eliminated.  
 
The United States should rely on free-market exchange, not protectionist import policies, 
to promote and improve America’s competitiveness both at home and abroad. Though 
protectionist policies may benefit certain industry segments, the market distortions that 
are created lead to higher prices and reduced domestic consumption. Moreover, the 
industry segments that are protected have less incentive to innovate and reduce their 
costs. As a consequence, the industries themselves may suffer from their lack of global 
competitiveness, leading to decreased revenues from foreign sales. The longer 
protectionist policies are in place, the less competitive the industries will become. 
Reducing import restrictions would lead to the greater development of weapons systems 
and their associated products, both in terms of quantity and quality, while spurring 
economic growth. 
There is also a known link between trade and the decreased likelihood of war. McDonald 
(2004) writes that there is “substantial empirical support for the proposition that 
increasing levels of cross-border economic flows … decrease[s] the probability of 
conflict” (p. 547). One might argue that this link is even stronger within the context of 
trade in defense-related items.   
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There are numerous potential roadblocks to implementing these key recommendations. Every 
lawmaker, regulator, business interest, and foreign country has its own incentives in mind, and 
thus each has a different perspective on how—or even whether—the import and export 
regulations should be changed.  
Congress is perhaps the most important constituency as it will need to approve of the changes 
and, ultimately, write them into law. Regional biases will likely come into play, as will specific 
interests within each congressional district. A Congress member from a district that supplies 
basic materials to the military, such as textiles, will want to ensure that the Berry Amendment 
remains in effect, whereas a market-oriented congressman with little stake in the matter may 
champion the need for federal budget reduction or increased protectionism. 
Changes to the export control laws would also elicit various perspectives from members of 
Congress. For example, a Congress member representing the suburbs of Washington, DC, might 
be more likely to push for a reduction of export control restrictions. Many of his constituents 
work for defense contractors and are headquartered in the area. On the other hand, autarkic 
members may view the issue differently, citing potential for abuse and the unwanted spread of 





Our import–export control systems, originally established to protect American security interests, 
have begun to undermine the economic, technologic, and military capabilities of the United 
States. Meaningful reform of these systems is required to place the U.S. on a strong strategic 
(economic and military) footing for the future. 
Since the last major revisions of these systems, the world has changed markedly. Whereas the 
United States was once the unrivaled leader in most technological fields, today it is one of 
several leaders in many technological fields (and in some fields, the United States lags 
considerably). The United States can no longer afford to pursue an import–export regime that 
reduces American access to new technologies while protecting uncompetitive domestic firms and 
restricting leading U.S. companies from pursuing foreign sales abroad. To be sure, certain 
technologies must be protected. But, the best way to ensure that this occurs is by reducing the 
scale and scope of the current restrictions so that attention can be focused on specific 
technologies, the protection of which is vital to U.S. security interests.  
The administration has recently taken steps to update how the U.S. government protects sensitive 
technologies and regulates exports of munitions and commercial items with military applications. 
These rules will affect items regulated for export under two categories on the USML (Aircraft 
and Associated Equipment and Gas Turbine Engines). Both of these categories are extremely 
important to the aerospace industry and represent more than $20 billion in annual exports. There 
are plans to continue the reviews and reform the remaining 17 categories of the USML 
categories. This is certainly a step in the right direction (Department of State, Office of the 
Spokesperson, 2013). The failure to reorient our priorities in the new global environment will 
only lead to technological decline and obsolescence in certain industry segments. Technological 
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